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MODERN FAMILY: INTRAFAMILY ADOPTION IN 
LOUISIANA AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
(COSTANZA AND BREWER V. CALDWELL) 
Tiffany S. Bush* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does 
not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written 
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of 
the legislature.1 This code article illustrates one of the most 
fundamental notions of the civil law tradition. Louisiana’s Civil 
Code and the state’s constitution often have run-ins with each 
other, but issues have often been resolved by reference to the civil 
code’s idea that clear meaning should be adopted where reasonable 
and unless clear meaning leads to strange results, it should always 
be followed.  
But, when the clear meaning of the Civil Code and Louisiana’s 
constitution conflict with the less clear meaning of the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a conflict arises that is not so 
easily resolved. Over time, the federal courts have interpreted 14th 
Amendment to provide various protections of citizens’ rights.2 The 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2016) Paul M. Hébert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier 
Moréteau for his continued guidance and support in preparing this note. 
Additionally, the author would like to acknowledge the vigorous efforts of the 
Journal of Civil Law Studies’ staff. 
 This note was written prior to the judgment delivered on June 26, 2015, by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling 
that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 1. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 9. 
 2. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
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Supreme Court of the United States, several times, has extended 
these protections to individuals who were previously 
unrepresented, but due to a widespread change in societal attitudes, 
there was a shift in societal norms that warranted change. 
Louisiana and states like it have been resistant to these periodic 
shifts of societal norms.  
This case presents a particularly confounding disagreement 
between the Code, Louisiana’s Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution on the issue of same-sex marriage. Though the Civil 
Code is clear on the status of same-sex marriage in Louisiana, the 
changing face of the family structure in our society may mean that 
the relevant code articles are outdated. Historically, Louisiana has 
been reluctant to change their laws in the face of an evolving 
society and many times, Louisiana has been one of the last states to 
change its laws and customs, especially in cases where the debate 
is on a substantial issue such as marriage and society seems to take 
an approach in opposition of that accepted in Louisiana. 
Interestingly, Louisiana judges make their voices heard in the 
debate and the opinions issued may come as a surprise. This case 
note will briefly discuss the issues at play in the case and analyze 
the way in which the court tackled issues and produced an opinion 
that strategically dismantles the archaic norms that are currently 
adhered to in Louisiana. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 2004, Chasity Brewer gave birth to a baby boy while living 
in California.3 At the time, Brewer was unmarried, and the child 
                                                                                                             
 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 3. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 
D2, [15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014). At the time of this comment, there were no 
page numbers available for the judge’s ruling because the opinion had not yet 
been published. Therefore, all citations to this ruling are to the whole opinion in 
general. 
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was conceived as a result of insemination by an anonymous sperm 
donor.4 In 2008, Brewer and her partner, Angela Costanza, were 
married in California, where same-sex marriages are permitted.5 
By 2013, the couple came to live in Lafayette Parish in the state of 
Louisiana and in July 2013, Angela Costanza filed a petition for 
intrafamily adoption so that she may have parental rights to 
Brewer’s son.6  
In January of 2014, counsel for Costanza and Brewer presented 
the couples’ entire adoption file to the court.7 Costanza, Brewer 
and their child were present, but the Attorney General for 
Louisiana was not.8 The court reviewed the entire adoption file 
and, after finding that all contents were in the proper form, granted 
the intrafamily adoption on January 27, 2014.9  
In March 2014, the Attorney General for Louisiana, James 
Caldwell, filed an appeal in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.10 
Citing Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure, the Attorney General 
stated that he was not given notice or any opportunity to be heard 
and the judgment should be vacated and remanded because of 
this.11 Costanza and Brewer (the “petitioners”) asked the court to 
                                                                                                             
 4. “According to the California Uniform Parentage Act, the anonymous 
sperm donor bears no rights to and no responsibilities for children born through 
donor insemination using his semen. The biological father remains to be 
unknown.” Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 2013-
0052 D2, [15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014). 
 5. At the time of their marriage, both women were at the age of majority. 
 6. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 7. The Fifteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, In re Adoption of 
N.B., 140 So.3d 1263 (2014). 
 8. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 9. The court reviewed a number of documents, including: an Authentic Act 
of Consent to Adoption from the biological mother (Chasity Brewer), a criminal 
records check from the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish, and a Child Welfare State 
Central Registry Check. The final decree of adoption and judgment was signed 
on February 5, 2014. 
 10. Attorney General Caldwell moved the court for a Suspensive Appeal 
from the final adoption decree signed in February. Additionally, the Attorney 
General and the Governor (the “defendants”) also filed a peremptory exception 
of no cause of action and both sides filed motions for summary judgment. See 
Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza and Brewer v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 D2, 
[15th JDC] (Feb. 22, 2014). 
 11. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1572: 
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reaffirm the February 2014 judgment of adoption and alleged that 
their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the 
14th amendment of the United States Constitution would be denied 
if the final decree of adoption was thrown out.12 Additionally, 
petitioners asserted that the state of Louisiana violated Article IV, 
Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Full Faith & 
Credit Clause, by refusing to recognize their California marriage.13 
Lastly, petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana’s 
Defense of Marriage Act14 and several articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code.15  
 
                                                                                                             
 
The clerk shall give written notice of the date of the trial whenever a 
written request therefore is filed in the record or is made by registered 
mail by a party or counsel of record. This notice shall be mailed by the 
clerk, by certified mail, properly stamped and addressed, at least ten 
days before the date fixed for the trial. The provisions of this article 
may be waived by all counsel of record at a pre-trial conference. 
 12. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 13. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 14. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15: 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one 
man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall 
construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or 
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union 
other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status 
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No official or court of the 
state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other 
jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman. 
 15. The challenged civil code provisions are as follows: 
 “Marriage is a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created 
by civil contract. The relationship and the contract are subject to special rules 
prescribed by law.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 86. 
 “Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each other.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 89. 
 LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15: 
A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong 
public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted 
in another state shall not be recognized in this state for any purpose, 
including the assertion of any right or claim as a result of the purported 
marriage. 
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III. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The court addressed four issues set forth by the parties: 
– Whether Louisiana Constitution Article XII, Section 15 (the 
Defense of Marriage Act), and Louisiana Civil code Articles 86, 
89, and 3520(B) violate the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 
– Whether, for purposes of the federal Due Process Clause, the 
right to marry someone of the same sex is a right deeply grounded 
in our Nation’s history and tradition; 
– Whether the authority to recognize out-of-state marriages 
falls within the traditional authority of States over domestic 
relations law; and 
– Whether Louisiana Constitution Art. XII, Section 15, 
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 86, 89, and 3520(B) violate Article 
IV, Section I, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, of the United States 
Constitution.16 
The court ruled that Louisiana’s Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the 14th amendment and is therefore unconstitutional.17 
Additionally, Louisiana Civil Code Articles 86, 89, and 3520(B) 
were also declared unconstitutional for violating the same 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.18  
With regard to the question of whether the right to marry 
someone of the same sex constitutes a fundamental right for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause, the court appears to conclude 
that the right is fundamental. The court’s analysis of this issue was 
largely made up of an analogy drawn between this case and 
Kitchen v. Herbert, a case that came out of the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, where a same-sex couple sought to have their marriage 
recognized in Utah.19  
                                                                                                             
 16. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, generally, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
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The court also relied on similar reasoning that was adopted by 
a number of other cases to bolster their position.20 Last, the court 
held that the authority to recognize out-of-state marriages does not 
fall within the traditional authority of States over domestic 
relations law and, as such, the relevant provisions of the Louisiana 
Constitution and Civil Code violate the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Constitution and is unconstitutional.21 
IV. COMMENTARY 
Same-sex marriage has been a hot-button issue for scholars, 
legislators and the judiciary. Though the primary focus for the 
courts has been the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans,22 
with many states moving to legalize same-sex marriage, focus has 
slowly been shifting towards the legal effects of same-sex marriage 
in states that continue to ban gay marriage. This court methodically 
analyzed each constitutional issue and by drawing on several 
strong policy concerns of Louisiana, issued a ruling that should 
stand if reviewed by an appellate court.23  
According to the judgment, the Louisiana provisions that 
outlaw same-sex marriage (art. 86 La. CC and La. Const.) and 
forbid the recognition of same-sex marriages contracted out of 
state (La. Const.) violate two clauses in the U.S. Constitution.24  
The court found Louisiana DOMA’s tendency to “make 
unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages” violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal 
Protection Clause requires that no state shall deny a person equal 
protection under its laws. Louisiana’s DOMA, as well as the Civil 
Code articles, specifically article 86, does just that. Equal 
                                                                                                             
 20. See Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The United States Supreme Court is expected to address the issue in 
Summer 2015. 
 23. The Attorney General appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court and the appeal is currently pending.  
 24. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
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protection has not been interpreted to tolerate equal application of 
facially discriminatory laws. Instead, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that states protect the constitutional rights of all 
individuals. The right to marry has been identified as a 
fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution.25 
Additionally, some courts have recognized other rights bearing 
close relation to the right to marry, such as a parent’s right to raise 
their children, without undue interruption from the state, as being 
protected by the Constitution as well.26  
Both provisions of Louisiana law expressly limit legal 
recognition of marriage between a man and woman only. These 
provisions unduly interfere with the rights of same-sex couples to 
marry by not allowing their marriage to be recognized legally. In 
turn, same-sex couples are unable to benefit from the civil effects 
of marriage, including intrafamily adoption like Constanza and 
Brewer are trying to attain here. Furthermore, the additional Civil 
Code articles at issue here blatantly violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution because they facially discriminate 
against a certain class of individuals by not allowing them to 
marry, simply because of who they choose to marry. 
Next, the court tackled the issue of Louisiana’s refusal to 
recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully entered into in 
California.27 The petitioners asserted that the state’s refusal to 
recognize their marriage violated Article IV, Section I, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, of the United States Constitution, stating 
that the denial is “unmerited and does not fall within the discretion 
of a State”28 and further, Louisiana has not cited any compelling 
public policy that would allow the state to deny valid marriages 
                                                                                                             
 25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967). 
 26. Here, the court quoted the Tenth Circuit case, Kitchen v. Hebert, saying: 
“Thus childrearing, a liberty closely related to the right to marry, is one 
exercised by same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike, as well as by single 
individuals.” Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3 (quoting Kitchen, supra 
n. 19). 
 27. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 28. Id. 
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from other states.29 The defendants contended that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause does not require the state of Louisiana to 
recognize the out-of-state marriage because “[o]ne State’s 
marriage is not a ‘judgment’ that merits full faith and credit in 
another State.”30 Citing two older Supreme Court cases directly on 
point,31 the court agreed with the petitioners’ arguments on this 
point, finding that marriage has, historically, been recognized as a 
judgment that merits full faith and credit in another state.32  
The constitutional analysis set forth by the court is very strong 
on its own, but the court increases the strength of the argument by 
using the state’s strong policy of promoting intact families and 
making decisions in the best interest of the children.33 The 
defendants argued that Louisiana’s marriage and adoption laws are 
linked to the furtherance of two state interests: “a) linking children 
to intact families formed by their biological parents, and b) 
ensuring that fundamental social change occurs through 
widespread social consensus.”34Citing the ruling from Meyer v. 
Nebraska, the court stated that the right to marry and raise children 
is a fundamental right and that the petitioners “are in a better 
position than the state to make decisions regarding the custody and 
care of the child.”35 The court added that “there is no rational 
connection between Louisiana’s laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage and its goal of linking children to intact families formed 
by their biological parents, or ensuring that fundamental social 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. 
 30. Citing the RESTATEMENT (2D) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 92, Williams v. 
North Carolina, Sevcik, Baker v. Nelson. 
 31. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 269 U.S. 268 (1935); Sherrer v. 
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
 32. In Milwaukee County, the Court held that “the public policy of the 
forum state must give way,” because the “very purpose of the full-faith and 
credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties.” In Sherrer, the Court ordered Massachusetts to give full faith and 
credit to a Florida divorce decree. 
 33. Minute Entry Ruling, Costanza, supra n. 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska). 
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change occurs through widespread social consensus.”36 Since 
Louisiana already allows adoptions by foster parents and those 
with no biological link to the child, according to the court here, it 
would be illogical to say that intact families are only those that are 
formed by a child’s biological parents.”37 
The court addressed Louisiana’s Defense of Marriage Act and 
adopted the reasoning set forth in United States v. Windsor, where 
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act 
because “it found that the purpose of that Act [was] to influence or 
interfere with the state’s sovereign choices about who may be 
married.”38 Quoting Windsor, the court added: “DOMA’s principal 
effect is to identify and make unequal a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under the 
laws of their state, but not others, of both rights and 
responsibilities. [T]hough Congress has great authority to design 
laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot 
deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”39 Though U.S. v. Windsor struck down the federal 
DOMA for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the state laws and legislation must comport with the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Finding that 
Louisiana’s DOMA was drafted with almost the exact language of 
the federal DOMA, the court ruled that the constitutional provision 
is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the face of what constitutes a 
“family” is changing. Our society’s view of same-sex marriage has 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (citing United States v. Windsor). 
 39. Id. 
 40. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states. 
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slowly shifted from disapproval and prejudice towards same-sex 
couples to an attitude of tolerance and many are proponents of 
equal protection of gay couples under our laws. With increasing 
pressure from the public to change the laws that discriminate 
against same-sex couples and increasing splits in the state court 
system, the final word on same-sex marriage may soon be 
pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States. Though 
there is a large portion of the population who advocate for 
marriage rights for same-sex couples, there are still those who 
favor the traditional recognition of marriage between a man and 
woman only.  
This case illustrates a coming change in the United States and a 
remarkable turn in state court adjudication. Southern states, in 
general, strongly favor the traditional approach. This makes the 
courage displayed by the Honorable Judge Rubin ruling all the 
more commendable. In order to effect widespread change, the state 
courts need to keep producing opinions striking down the state 
laws that unconstitutionally deprive same-sex couples of their 
rights. There will be more rulings like Judge Rubin’s, moving up 
through the court system and signaling the need for the Supreme 
Court to hear and ultimately decide the legality of same-sex 
marriage in the United States. Until that time, state court judges 
will play a prominent role in applying pressure to state legislatures 
to repeal their discriminatory laws.41  
                                                                                                             
 41. Since the presiding district judge, the Honorable Judge Rubin, declared 
provisions of Louisiana’s state law unconstitutional, the Attorney General was 
entitled to a direct appeal to the state’s Supreme Court. The appeal is currently 
pending and was argued before the Louisiana Supreme Court January 25, 2015. 
